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INTRODUCTION
Changes in technology, namely the rise of the Internet and social
media in everyday use, have created a league of new legal issues for
the courts and legislatures to contend with. As rapidly as technology
changes, legal frameworks and common law cannot always keep up
with the new problems society faces, leading to gaps in civil reme-
dies that allow inappropriate behavior to proceed unchecked.1 In
particular, as people’s images and personas are consistently shared,
1. Amanda L. Cecil, Note, Taking Back the Internet: Imposing Civil Liability on
Interactive Computer Services in an Attempt to Provide an Adequate Remedy to Victims
of Nonconsensual Pornography, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2513, 2525 (2014).
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sometimes hundreds or thousands of times, by friends and strangers
on the Internet, it becomes harder for individuals to control the dis-
semination of their information and exercise their right to privacy.2
This has culminated in a horrifying phenomenon known colloquially
as “revenge porn.” 3
Everyone has felt the sting of rejection or the pain of heart-
break. For centuries, spurned lovers, reeling from these pains, have
sought revenge against their ex-paramours.4 These acts can be seen
in everyone from King Henry VIII,5 who murdered two wives after
accusing them of adultery, to the Greek myth Medea,6 who killed
her children in retaliation for her husband Jason leaving her for
another woman, to modern day pop star Taylor Swift, who pens
songs about her ex-lovers to let the world know of their betrayals.7
This desire to exact pain against an ex–loved one has transformed
with the rise of technology.8 With the advent of social media, indi-
viduals have a much larger platform to air grievances or exact re-
venge on others.9 This has led to instances where an individual’s
private information, often in the form of sexually explicit pictures
or videos, is shared online to hundreds of thousands of people (with-
out the individual’s knowledge or consent) by an ex-lover or partner
seeking revenge.10 Additionally, these social media “grievances” or
“acts of revenge” can have a permanent place on the Internet, as
social media websites, such as Reddit or Twitter, often cannot remove
images from their original hosting websites.11 Victims have almost
2. The right to privacy is a common law concept that the Supreme Court deemed is
a right each individual State should apply for its citizens. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347,
350–51 (1967).
3. Cecil, supra note 1, at 2520.
4. See, e.g., Henry VIII’s Wives, HISTORIC ROYAL PALACES (2017), http://www.hrp.org
.uk/discover-the-palaces/monarchs/henry-viii/henry-viiis-wives [https://perma.cc/JX5Y
-ASMA]; Medea, GREEKMYTHOLOGY.COM (2017), https://www.greekmythology.com/Myths
/Mortals/Medea/medea.html [https://perma.cc/4GRS-AWNE].
5. Henry VIII’s Wives, supra note 4.
6. Medea, supra note 4.
7. Katie Rosseinsky, 13 Times Taylor Swift’s Ex-Boyfriends Inspired Her Music,
GRAZIA DAILY (Aug. 10, 2016), http://lifestyle.one/grazia/celebrity/news/taylor-swift-ex
-boyfriends-song-lyrics [https://perma.cc/7BYB-X2N8].
8. See Nick Hopkins & Oliver Solon, Facebook Flooded with “Sextortion” and Revenge
Porn, File Reveals, THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/news
/2017/may/22/facebook-flooded-with-sextortion-and-revenge-porn-files-reveal [https://
perma.cc/XA62-8D4Z].
9. Brian Jung, The Negative Effect of Social Media on Society and Individuals,
CHRON SMALL BUSINESS (2017), http://smallbusiness.chron.com/negative-effect-social
-media-society-individuals-27617.html [https://perma.cc/S4Q4-CWS6].
10. Cecil, supra note 1, at 2515.
11. Carl Franzen, Revenge Porn Is the Hydra of the Internet, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 12,
2015), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/twitter-follows-reddit-in-banning-re
venge-porn-but-so-what [https://perma.cc/NEJ5-MY4K].
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no way to remove their private, sexually explicit images from the
public eye.12
Also known as nonconsensual pornography, revenge porn is the
distribution of sexually explicit photos or videos of another individ-
ual without that individual’s consent or knowledge.13 The name
“revenge porn” arose from its common use as a revenge mechanism
for spurned lovers or ex-partners who decided to enact vengeance on
their former loved ones by posting intimate images or videos of them
online for the digital world to see.14 Revenge porn is the ultimate
violation of another’s privacy, inviting our internet-driven society to
view, share, and comment on the most intimate aspects of one’s
life.15 Embarrassment, shame, body image and self-esteem issues
are just a few of the negative consequences that can stem from being
victim to a revenge porn attack.16
This issue has become particularly troublesome for today’s pub-
lic figures and celebrities, a group that traditionally does not have
access to any recourse for invasions of their privacy.17 For public
12. Id.
13. Cecil, supra note 1, at 2515. See also Emily Poole, Fighting Back Against Non-
consensual Pornography, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 181, 185 (2015) (expanding the definition of
revenge pornography to include an intent to embarrass or shame the individual whose
photos are being posted, which is not always present in cases involving public f igures);
Zak Franklin, Justice for Revenge Porn Victims: Legal Theories to Overcome Claims of Civil
Immunity by Operators of Revenge Porn Websites, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (2014).
For a legal perspective, the National Conference of State Legislatures defines revenge
porn as “the posting of nude or sexually explicit photographs or videos of people online
without their consent, even if the photograph itself was taken with consent.” Revenge
Porn and its Victims, NOBULLYING.COM (July 26, 2016), https://nobullying.com/revenge
-porn [https://perma.cc/98B3-5U9U].
14. Words in the news: revenge porn, OXFORD DICTIONARIES (Feb. 17, 2015), http://blog
.oxforddictionaries.com/2015/02/words-news-revenge-porn [https://perma.cc/C6JT-32RF].
15. Poole, supra note 13, at 185. An inherent feature to social media is the interaction
between individuals, often concerning messages or media posted by either of them or
someone else. These interactions can turn cruel, as anonymous users feel comfortable
saying whatever they please (regardless of social conventions inherent in face to face con-
versation). This cruelty adds to a revenge porn victim’s sense of shame and helplessness.
16. Mudasir Kamel & William J. Newman, Revenge Pornography: Mental Health
Implications and Related Legislation, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 359, 359, 362
(2016). These negative consequences will be discussed in more detail below. However, it
is important to keep in mind the negative consequences of revenge porn for celebrities
as this argument unfolds. Celebrities are often seen as separate beings from private
citizens and it is easy to forget that they suffer psychological, emotional, and real world
damage just as easily as the private population.
17. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 255, 279–80 (1964). In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court established a high standard for public f igures
to recover for the dissemination of false facts about them. The Court held that public
f igures had to prove an individual spread false information about them with actual
malicious intent to recover a civil remedy for the dissemination of that false fact. The
Court’s reasoning centered around the idea that “[f ]ree and open debate about the
conduct of public off icials . . . was more important than occasional, honest factual errors
that might hurt or damage [public] off icials’ reputation[ ].” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan
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figure victims of revenge porn, revenge is not always the motivation
behind the sharing of sexually explicit photos or videos of celebri-
ties.18 As researchers Mudasir Kamel and William J. Newman note,
“the term revenge pornography may be misleading, as not all perpe-
trators are motivated by vengeance. Some individuals participate in
the distribution of explicit content to earn a profit. Others are moti-
vated by notoriety or entertainment.”19 Additionally, the term “revenge
porn” can be used in the case of public figures because the act (shar-
ing the photos without the public figure’s consent) and the conse-
quences (emotional, financial, and social damages) are similar to
that of traditional “revenge porn.” 20
Society’s fascination with celebrities has led to a huge demand
for any private information about these public figures, particularly
any sexually explicit or private material.21 Unfortunately, in this
scenario, the United States common law has developed around the
idea that public figures voluntarily inject themselves into the public
sphere and invite the scrutiny that is inherent in the public eye.22
However, this common law doctrine developed in the decades before
the rise of the Internet and social media and the privacy issues that
have come along with it.23 Access to the Internet has given rise to
some incredibly horrific privacy violations, including the sharing of
one’s private, sensitive, financial, or medical information to an in-
finite number of people, often with little ability to stop the spread
of the information once it has been released.24 As access to public
figures’ lives becomes more intrusive, courts need to adapt the public
figure doctrine to be more sympathetic to the privacy needs of those
in the public spotlight.
(1964), BILL OF RIGHTS INST. (2017), https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator
-resources/lessons-plans/landmark-supreme-court-cases-elessons/new-york-times-v
-sullivan-1964 [https://perma.cc/TL7N-WK9W].
18. Kamel & Newman, supra note 16, at 361.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 362.
21. Nora Turriago, The Dangerous American Obsession: Why Are We So Fascinated
With Fame?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nora
-turriago/the-dangerous-american-ob_b_8721632.html [https://perma.cc/TG84-Z45R].
22. Olympia R. Duhart, When Time Stands Still: An Argument For Restoring Public
Figures to Private Status, 27 NOVA L. REV. 365, 373–74 (2002). See generally Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974). Gertz formally legalized this harsh public-
f igure standard that led to the inability of public f igures to recover under IIED or in-
vasion of privacy claims in most circumstances.
23. Gertz and the other initial public-f igure-doctrine cases were decided in the 1960s
and the 1970s, decades before the rise of the Internet and social media. See Gertz, 418
U.S. at 323.
24. Bob Sullivan, Online Privacy Fears Are Real, NBCNEWS (Dec. 6, 2013), http://
www.nbcnews.com/id/3078835/t/online-privacy-fears-are-real/#.WLcO6BLys6U [https://
perma.cc/8QSG-JFRT].
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Public figures should have two specific civil remedies that are
available for non-public figures—recovery for intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED) and invasion of privacy through public
disclosure of private facts—against individuals who post pornographic
or sexually explicit images without the public figure’s consent.25
While it is well-established in case law that public figures do not enjoy
the same right of privacy as non-public figures,26 by nature of their
public work and lifestyle, this should not apply in cases of revenge
porn. Courts should view nonconsensual pornography differently
because the reason behind limiting remedies for public figures in
privacy cases—that information about the public figure is a matter of
legitimate public interest27—does not apply to private, pornographic
information that is not shared by the celebrity themselves.
It should be noted that the issue of revenge porn can come
about from two different situations. One way is for a person to have
private or pornographic photos or videos of their person taken
without their knowledge and then distributed online.28 The second
way is for a person to knowingly and willingly take private or nude
photos or videos of their person, but to have these private materials
stolen and distributed online without their permission.29 This Note
largely concerns the second situation, where the individual’s private
sexual images are disseminated without her knowledge or consent.
This is due to the fact that there is already criminal recourse in
place for the first situation.30
Part I of this Note will document various scenarios in which
celebrities and public figures were victims of nonconsensual pornog-
raphy and the harms they suffered from the invasion, both in their
private lives and their careers. Part II will then trace the current civil
25. See 136 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 175, Proof of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress § 4, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2017) (citing Drussel v. Elko
County School Dist., No. 3:12-cv-00551-HDM-WGC, 2013 WL 3353531 (D. Nev. July 2,
2013)); 103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 159, Invasion of Privacy by Public Disclosure
of Private Facts § 2, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2017).
26. See Duhart, supra note 22, at 366.
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–45.
28. Maayan Y. Vodovis, Look Over Your Figurative Shoulder: How to Save Individual
Dignity and Privacy on the Internet, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 829 (2011). Vodovis’s
article deals almost explicitly with the f irst situation, in which a person’s private or nude
image is taken without their knowledge.
29. Jessica E. Easterly, Terror in Tinseltown: Who is Accountable When Hollywood
gets Hacked, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 342–43. Easterly’s article details more of the second
situation, in which a person’s own private photos are stolen and disseminated without
their knowledge or consent. This is often the case in celebrity victim porn situations, where
pictures are taken off private computers or servers and then distributed anonymously.
30. Vodovis, supra note 28, at 817.
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remedies available to non–public figure victims of revenge porn,
namely recovering under claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and invasion of privacy. Part III will define “public figure”
and then trace the history of the American judiciary’s reluctance to
provide privacy remedies to public figures. Finally, this Note will
conclude by arguing that the public figure doctrine should not apply
in situations of nonconsensual pornography and also explain why
possible alternatives to invasion of privacy and IIED claims are not
sufficient options for public figure victims.
I. A COMMON PHENOMENON—EXAMPLES OF INVASION OF
PRIVACY OF PUBLIC FIGURES
In August and September 2014, hundreds of photographs of
over 100 public figures, most of which contained nude or sexually
explicit images of the celebrities, were released on an “imageboard”
website called 4chan.31 The photos were subsequently spread around
the Internet through different social media sites, such as Reddit.32
The individuals who released these photos, known collectively as the
“hackers,” gained access to the photos by hacking into celebrities’
iCloud accounts and downloading the sensitive images.33 The hack
and subsequent release of the photos made major headlines for
weeks after the incident, giving further attention to the victims’
photos and predicament.34
One of the most well-known and vocal victims of this attack was
actress Jennifer Lawrence.35 Lawrence did not shy away from her
victimization, and instead chose to speak out about the attack and
how it affected her life and mental health.36 In an interview with
Vanity Fair magazine, Lawrence stated, in reference to the release
of her private images, “I can’t even describe to anybody what it feels
like to have my naked body shoot across the world like a news flash
31. Adrianne Jeffries, ‘Celebgate’ attack leaks nude photos of celebrities, THE VERGE
(Sept. 2, 2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/2/6099307/celebgate-attack
-leaks-nude-photos-of-more-than-100-celebrities [https://perma.cc/Z5DQ-CFZ2].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Sam Kashner, Both Huntress and Prey, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2014), http://www
.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-photo-hacking-privacy [https://perma
.cc/NF6Y-86FX]. Lawrence’s popularity, especially among young women and girls, has had
a profound impact on how she has responded to the leak. Her message of empowerment
speaks volumes to how serious this situation can be for women worldwide.
36. Id.
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against my will. It just makes me feel like a piece of meat that’s
being passed around for a profit.” 37 Lawrence’s description shows
the intense harms that come from revenge porn invasions of privacy,
harms the court could not expect prior to the Internet and social
media age.38 “Just because I’m a public figure, just because I’m an
actress, does not mean that I asked for this,” Lawrence goes on to
say.39 “It does not mean that it comes with the territory. It’s my body,
and it should be my choice, and the fact that it is not my choice is
absolutely disgusting.” 40
Another victim of the attack, U.S. Olympic gymnast McKayla
Maroney, was underage at the time her sexually explicit photos were
taken.41 Photos of her are legally considered child pornography, which
attach significant criminal ramifications for the hackers and the
websites who publish these photos.42 Several of the imageboard web-
sites, including Reddit, immediately removed the photos after being
contacted by Maroney’s representatives and learning that Maroney
was underage in the photos.43 However, as noted above, the images
can remain on the Internet through the images’ original hosting
website.44 Other victims included supermodel Kate Upton, U.S. soc-
cer star Hope Solo, and singer Rihanna.45 All of these victims were
well-known public figures with successful careers that involved
some aspect of public consumption.
More recently, reality TV star Robert Kardashian made head-
lines when he posted nude images of his ex-fiancée Blac Chyna, the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Gil Kaufman, Gymnast McKayla Maroney Says She’s Underage in Hacked Photos,
MTV (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.mtv.com/news/1919057/gymnast-mckayla-maroney
-underage-hacked-photos-liz-lee [https://perma.cc/QTN6-MQVC]. While Maroney was
of age at the time the photos were leaked, her image as an underage sports icon had
widespread affect on young female athletes. Nude photos of Maroney could have had a
negative effect on the positivity that women’s gymnastic emanates in the United States,
especially during summer Olympics years.
42. “Section 2256 of Title 18, United States Code, defines child pornography as any
visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor (someone under 18 years
of age).” Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child Pornography, DEP’T OF JUST.
(July 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child
-pornography [https://perma.cc/6JXD-K8UJ].
43. Stephanie Marcus, McKayla Maroney Was Reportedly Underage In Hacked Nude
Photos, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/02
/mckayla-maroney-underage-nude-photos_n_5755600.html [https://perma.cc/LNA8-ZAKR].
44. Franzen, supra note 11.
45. Fay Strang, Celebrity 4chan Shock Naked Picture Scandal: Full List of Star
Victims Preyed Upon by Hackers, MIRROR (Oct. 20, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.mirror
.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/celebrity-4chan-shock-naked-picture-4395155 [https://perma
.cc/ZGF8-BSGJ].
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mother of Kardashian’s child and a well-known model and public
figure, on the social media platforms Instagram and Twitter.46 While
the images were promptly removed by Instagram and Twitter mod-
erators, the images had reached up to 10 million users who follow
Kardashian on those sites.47
There have been other celebrity victims of revenge porn situa-
tions in years past. Actress Vanessa Hudgens had nude photos of
herself released online without her knowledge or consent in 2007.48
At the time of this photo leak, Hudgens was starring in a popular
kids movie franchise on the Disney Channel.49 Her popularity
among children caused a great outcry from parents and resulted in
Hudgens’ employer, Disney, releasing a statement that was reminis-
cent of victim-blaming.50 Disney stated that they hoped Hudgens
had “learned a valuable lesson” after the incident.51 The idea that it
is the public figure’s fault for the dissemination of sexually explicit
photos, or that she should be punished or blamed for taking the
photos in the first place, is one of the major consequences celebrity
victims of nonconsensual pornography can face.52
An additional similarity between all of the victims of this hack-
ing, and other past victims of celebrity revenge porn, is that they were
all women.53 While revenge porn is not gender exclusive, “evidence
46. Katie Mettler, What Rob Kardashian did to Blac Chyna could be ‘revenge porn,’
lawyers say, and illegal, WASH. POST (July 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/07/06/what-rob-kardashian-did-to-blac-chyna-could-be
-revenge-porn-lawyers-say-and-illegal [https://perma.cc/XFW2-CTUZ].
47. Id.
48. See People Staff, Vanessa Hudgens ‘Embarrassed,’ Apologizes for Nude Photo,
PEOPLE (Sept. 7, 2007, 5:00 PM), http://people.com/celebrity/vanessa-hudgens-embar
rassed-apologizes-for-nude-photo [https://perma.cc/7AKB-LNA5].
49. Id. This popular movie franchise is the High School Musical series, a trilogy that
teaches tolerance and the importance of being one’s self to children and teens. Hudgens’
nude photo leak was not in line with the message of the trilogy, something that many
fans and parents took note of. See High School Musical, IMDB (2017), http://www.imdb
.com/title/tt0475293 [https://perma.cc/EF4V-B79N].
50. People Staff, supra note 48.
51. Id. This statement suggests that Hudgens was to blame for taking the photos in
the f irst place, rather than placing blame on the individual who stole and leaked the
photos to the press. In this particular instance, Disney showed young women and girls
that men can be expected to use their sexuality and image in whatever way they want
but women should be ashamed of their sexuality and hide their bodies whenever
possible. This victim-blaming tactic is one of the major issues women face when dealing
with privacy invasions. See Bloom, infra note 52, at 250.
52. Sarah Bloom, No Vengeance for ‘Revenge Porn’ Victims: Unraveling Why this
Latest Female-Centric, Intimate-Partner Offense is Still Legal, and Why We Should Crimi-
nalize it, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 233, 246–47 (2014).
53. Amanda Marcotte, ‘The Fappening’ and Revenge Porn Culture: Jennifer Lawrence
and the Creepshot Epidemic, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 3, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.the
dailybeast.com/the-fappening-and-revenge-porn-culture-jennifer-lawrence-and-the
-creepshot-epidemic [https://perma.cc/6YLG-Q5T6].
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to date indicates that the majority of victims are female, and that
female victims often face more serious consequences as a result of
victimization.” 54 Additionally, men are more likely than women to
post the nonconsensual pornography onto social media.55
However, while revenge porn affects women more than men,
men can also be victims of nonconsensual publication of their nude
image.56 In what is perhaps the most notorious revenge porn legal
case to date, Hulk Hogan, a professional wrestler and TV star whose
real name is Terry Gene Bollea, won a multimillion-dollar settlement
against Gawker Media (Gawker) for invasion of Bollea’s privacy after
Gawker published a video showing Bollea involved in sexual inter-
course with Healther Clem, the wife of a friend.57 Bollea sued both
Gawker and Clem for invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclu-
sion, publication of private facts, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.58 Bollea ar-
gued, among other things, that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy to a video that showed him “fully naked and engaged in . . .
consensual sexual relations . . . in a private bedroom . . . .” 59 Bollea
also argued that the publishing of the video was “not of legitimate
public concern.” 60 At trial, the jury found Gawker liable for invasion
of privacy and awarded Bollea $115 million in compensatory dam-
ages and $25 million in punitive damages.61 Gawker appealed, and
ultimately settled with Bollea for $31 million.62
54. Frequently Asked Questions, CYBER CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE (2017), https://www
.cybercivilrights.org/faqs [https://perma.cc/5XK6-FMH6]. While revenge porn is a phe-
nomenon that affects all individuals—male, female, transgender, or gender nonconforming
individuals—it disproportionally affects females and those who identify as women. There
are a number of reasons this could be the case. First, harboring, stealing, or distributing
(or threatening to do any of the above) nude or sensitive images can be a means of control
used by males over their female partners. Second, society places more shame on women’s
sexuality/nudity than it does on men’s, meaning that the threat or action of revenge porn
against men may not be as harmful to a man as it is to a woman. And third, the idea that
women’s bodies and image are up for sale, or are meant to be shared, manipulated, and
controlled by males, is still pervasive in American culture. See Marcotte, supra note 53.
55. Revenge Porn and its Victims, supra note 13.
56. See Maria Bustillos, Everything You Need to Know About Hulk Hogan vs Gawker,
MOTHERBOARD (July 1, 2015, 10:19 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mgb
yd8/hulk-hogans-sex-tape-is-about-to-go-to-trial-gawker [https://perma.cc/QS7W-RDYY].
57. Id.
58. Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 9, 12, 15, 20, 21, Bollea v. Clem,
et al., No. 12012447-CI-011, at 9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 28, 2012).
59. Id. at 16.
60. Id.
61. Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks On $25 Million to Gawker’s Bill in Hulk Hogan Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/media/hulk
-hogan-damages-25-million-gawker-case.html [https://perma.cc/3E8K-JTXL].
62. Lukas I. Alpert, Gawker Media Settles With Hulk Hogan in Privacy Suit, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 2, 2016, 4:48 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gawker-media-settles-with-hulk
-hogan-in-privacy-suit-1478107236 [https://perma.cc/CW3F-8ZFF].
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A. Harms Suffered by Victims of the Distribution of
Nonconsensual Pornography
The harms of revenge porn affect celebrities and noncelebrities
in similar ways, as the act has a comparable psychological impact no
matter the fame of the public figure. A Huffington Post article cap-
tured the five biggest harms victims of revenge porn often felt or ex-
perienced: humiliation, concern for their personal safety, a need for
hypervigilance, fear of being watched during sex, and body shame.63
In addition to these emotional and personal harms, outside and real
world harms can also be suffered.64 These include job loss, harass-
ment or stalking by those that saw the pornography online, or
negative judgment from potential employers who discover the revenge
porn images through an online search.65
Sarah Bloom, a 2015 JD Candidate from Fordham University
School of Law, puts these real world harms of revenge porn into three
categories: problems in career and the workplace, increased vulner-
ability to suicide, and increased threats by third parties or ex-part-
ners.66 A woman’s reputation in her career or office can be damaged
when co-workers or colleagues find or distribute the images.67 A
simple Google search of a victim’s name can often reveal these
images, leading to easy access and notoriety.68 As mentioned above,
these searches can also negatively affect a future employer’s view of
the victim.69
The mental health of revenge porn victims, addressed by Bloom
in terms of suicide, is also a major harm of the nonconsensual por-
nography practice.70 According to studies done by the Cyber Civil
Rights Initiative, ninety-three percent of victims of nonconsensual
pornography reported suffering “significant emotional distress due
to being a victim.” 71 Forty-nine percent of the victims reported being
“harassed or stalked online by users who saw” the pornographic
63. Nina Bahadur, Victims of ‘Revenge Porn’ Open Up on Reddit About How it Im-
pacted Their Lives, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2014, 8:50 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/01/09/revenge-porn-stories-real-impact_n_4568623.html [https://perma
.cc/MBW7-W2DM].
64. Revenge Porn and its Victims, supra note 13.
65. Id.
66. Bloom, supra note 52, at 240.
67. Id. at 241.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 242.
71. Power in Numbers, CYBER CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.cyber
civilrights.org/revenge-porn-infographic [https://perma.cc/A4ZN-5LHP].
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images of the victim.72 These stressors can cause “anger, guilt, para-
noia, depression, or . . . suicide” in victims.73 There could also be
“deterioration in . . . relationships and [increased] . . . isolation” of
the victim.74
Beyond the individual harm suffered by victims of revenge porn,
there is a larger cultural issue that perpetrates greater harm to the
entire female population.75 Reporter Amanda Marcotte of The Daily
Beast summarizes the issue:
The real problem is a cultural one. While things have been defi-
nitely improving in recent decades as feminists raise awareness of
the problem of sexual violence and the importance of consent, there
are clearly still a large number of men who disregard women’s
basic human right to control your own body and own sexuality.
The men in these groups really do believe they are entitled to
own and control female bodies. While these insular misogynist
communities certainly end up reinforcing their ugly attitudes
toward women amongst themselves, they didn’t invent the notion
that women’s bodies are public property for men to use how they
please, regardless of a woman’s feelings about it. The only real,
long-term solution is to change a culture that inculcates young
men with these feelings of entitlement and teach respect for
women to boys starting at a young age.76
Marcotte’s analysis highlights the underlying feeling behind victims
of nonconsensual pornography—they are not entitled to control over
their bodies.77
B. Legal Remedies Imposed in the “Celebgate” Hacking and
Leak Incident
In January 2017, the man responsible for stealing the nude
images of Lawrence, along with a number of other women (some
famous, some not), was sentenced to nine months in federal prison
for the crime.78 The man, Edward Majerczyk, was charged with and
72. Id.
73. Kamel & Newman, supra note 16, at 362.
74. Id.
75. Marcotte, supra note 53.
76. Id. (f irst emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Timothy McLaughlin, Hacker Who Stole Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence and
Other Celebrities Jailed for Nine Months, INDEP. (Jan. 25, 2017, 7:16 AM), http://www.in
dependent.co.uk/news/world/americas/hacker-celebrity-nude-pictures-videos-jennifer
-lawrence-kate-upton-kirsten-dunst-edward-majerczyk-a7544626.html [https://perma
.cc/5LG9-34MU].
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convicted of federal computer hacking.79 This criminal sanction did
not address the posting of the photos themselves, only the stealing
of the images.80 Majerczyk was also ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $5,700 to one undisclosed celebrity victim of the attack.81
The victim had accrued financial loss from counseling needed to deal
with the emotional effects of the hack and photo leak.82 Two other
victims also requested the court order restitution from Majerczyk for
the costs accrued in having the photos taken offline.83
II. CIVIL REMEDIES FOR NON–PUBLIC FIGURE
VICTIMS OF REVENGE PORN
While non-public victims of revenge porn or the like have several
different legal recourses they can pursue, two of the most common
are recovery for damages from the distributor of the private images
through an intentional infliction of emotional distress or an invasion
of privacy based on the public disclosure of private facts claim.84
These traditional tort claims allow victims to seek redress without
having to go through the criminal justice system.85 Both remedies
have generally not been available to public figures, but the motives
behind this exclusion do not apply to the invasions of privacy inher-
ent in revenge porn situations.86 This Note will now dig deeper into
the IIED and invasion of privacy doctrines, both in general and for
public figures, to determine how courts have applied these remedies
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Jason Meisner, Chicagoan Gets Prison for ‘Celebgate’ Nude-Photo Hacking that
Judge Calls ‘Abhorrent,’ CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/local/breaking/ct-celebgate-hacking-scandal-sentencing-met-20170123-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5Q9T-ZQZ9].
82. Id.
83. Id. This Note will delve further into the idea of restitution as a remedy for public
f igure victims of nonconsensual pornography in Part IV.
84. Cecil, supra note 1, at 2529. This Article deals with the specif ic invasion of pri-
vacy tort based on the public disclosure of private facts about an individual without their
consent. Other types of invasion of privacy claims that may be relevant for public figure
victims of revenge porn are “unreasonable intrusion upon . . . another’s private affairs”
or “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.” See Williams, infra note 93.
While these options can be considered as a legal remedy for celebrities, this Note only
deals with the Public Disclosure of Private Facts privacy tort because it is the arguably
most easily attainable.
85. Cecil, supra note 1, at 2529–30.
86. Duhart, supra note 22, at 373–76. The motives behind the public figure doctrine—
that public figures insert themselves into the public eye and the public has a right to know
private information about them—has never, and should not, included a public f igure’s
body integrity and private nude photos.
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in the past and how they should apply them differently for public
figures in the future.
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Recovering under an IIED claim allows a victim to be compen-
sated for the monetary or psychological damage caused by the in-
flicter of emotional distress.87 The Second Restatement of Torts § 46
defines the IIED claim in the following way: “[o]ne who by extreme
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm.” 88 There are three elements that must be shown
to successfully show an IIED claim. First, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant acted with “extreme and outrageous conduct,
intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] . . . emotional distress.” 89 Sec-
ond, it needs to be proven by the preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress and “that no reason-
able man could be expected to endure it.” 90 And third, that the
defendant’s actions were the actual or proximate cause of the plain-
tiff’s emotional distress.91
The first requirement of a successful IIED claim—extreme or
outrageous conduct—is only satisfied when:
[T]he conduct [is] so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . and ut-
terly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of
the community would . . . lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” 92
The following two lower court cases are illustrative for applying the
outrageous or extreme conduct requirement to a revenge porn IIED
claim.
In Lewis v. Legrow, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that
the defendant’s action of sending three different ex-lovers videotapes
of his sexual encounters with each of the women (which none of the
women knew had been filmed) constituted conduct that the average
87. 136 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 175, supra note 25.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, at 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
89. Id. at 71.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 73.
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person would deem to be outrageous.93 In Del Mastro v. Grimado,
the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the action of sending
Christmas cards that contained sexually explicit images of the
defendant’s ex-girlfriend to his family and friends constituted outra-
geous or extreme conduct as necessary to fulfill an IIED claim.94 Both
of these cases show that spreading sexually explicit images or videos
of an ex-lover to other individuals, without the ex-lover’s knowledge
or consent, can constitute conduct that the average individual would
consider outrageous.95
The second requirement for an IIED claim—that the victim
suffered severe or extreme emotional distress—is held to the stan-
dard that the average, reasonable man would not be able to endure
the distress.96 Researchers Mudasir Kamel and William J. Newman,
psychiatrists writing for the Journal of the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law, argue that revenge porn victims can fulfill
this prong of the IIED claim “since the widespread dissemination of
private intimate photographs can have significant immediate and
lifelong mental health consequences.” 97 These consequences include
“anger, guilt, paranoia, depression, or even suicide,” as well as “de-
terioration in personal relationships and feelings of isolation.” 98
B. Invasion of Privacy Based on Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The Second Restatement of Torts defines invasion of privacy
through publicity given to private acts:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legiti-
mate concern to the public.99
The statements at issue do not need to be untrue, as in a defamation
or libel case.100 In fact, “it is generally the case that the matters dis-
closed or publicized are true, and it is the very truth of these publicly
93. Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). The Lewis case, and the
Del Mastro case discussed below, were highlighted in Williams. See Elizabeth Williams,
72 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 537, § 9 (2016).
94. Del Mastro v. Grimado, No. Civ. A. BER-C-388-03E, 2005 WL 2002355, at *1, 8
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005).
95. Del Mastro, 2005 WL 2002355, at *4; Lewis, 670 N.W.2d at 680–81.
96. Williams, supra note 93, at § 9 (discussing the standard established by the Del
Mastro Court). See Del Mastro, 2005 WL 2002355, at *2–3.
97. Kamel & Newman, supra note 16, at 363.
98. Id. at 362.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, at 383 (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
100. 103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 159, supra note 25, at § 2.
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revealed matters that causes the plaintiff such shame or humilia-
tion.”101 The definition also requires that the private acts not be of
public concern, preserving the right of the press to publish “news-
worthy matters” and foster an “uninhibited” discussion of legitimate
public issues.102
In cases concerning nonconsensual pornography, invasion of
privacy through publicity of private acts can usually be used as a
tort remedy if “the victim’s intimate photographs were stolen from
a personal electronic device or private online account.”103 The victim
also has to argue that their private or nude images are not “of public
concern.”104
In the invasion of privacy for public disclosure of private facts
claim, a victim can only recover if the facts, or information or im-
ages, are not of “legitimate public concern.”105 To determine if the
facts, even if deemed private, are of public concern, the court bal-
ances the rights of freedom of speech and press with the right of
privacy.106 Generally, the courts use a “newsworthy” standard to
determine if information is of legitimate public concern.107 However,
the courts have also had a hard time defining “newsworthy” as a
bright-line standard to be used in public disclosure of private facts
cases.108 David Elder, writing a treatise on privacy torts, explains
the courts’ conundrum:
The definition of what is newsworthy—containing that “indefin-
able quality of information that arouses the public’s interest and
attention”—is, in some respects, “somewhat broader” than the
“exceedingly difficult to define” notion of what is of legitimate
concern to the public. The cases do generally concede, however,
that not all true matters deemed newsworthy by the public are
covered by the common law privilege or the constitutional legiti-
mate concern to the public limitation. Ultimately, the standard
is one of “community mores” and the courts have generally con-
ceded that mere public curiosity is not enough.109
101. Id.
102. Id. § 6.
103. Kamel & Newman, supra note 16, at 363. Kamel and Newman’s study addressed
legal remedies and legislation available for noncelebrity victims of revenge porn.
104. Id.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, at 388 (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
106. Id.
107. DAVID A. ELDER, THE PUBLIC INTEREST—NEWSWORTHINESS LIMITATION, PRIVACY
TORTS § 3:17, 3-154–3-156 (July 2016).
108. Id. at 3-156.
109. Id. at 3-156–3-158.
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III. HISTORY OF DENYING PRIVACY REMEDIES FOR PUBLIC FIGURES
A. What Is a “Public Figure”?
Public figures hold a special status in common law, solidified in
defamation or libel cases that hold public figures to a higher stan-
dard to recover for privacy-related torts.110 The leading precedent for
the public figure doctrine, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, defines
public figures as “public official[s],” including elected government
officials and other individuals serving the public who willingly place
themselves in the public eye.111 This definition has expanded to in-
clude those who have gained notoriety “by virtue of his or her ac-
complishments, fame, or mode of life, or because of adoption of a
profession or calling that gives the public a legitimate interest in the
person’s activities or character.”112 Richard Kaye, writing for the
American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts, summarizes the term:
The status of being a public figure can be achieved in an infinite
number of ways, such as engaging in political activity, attaining
public office, acquiring eminence in science or other scholarly
fields, or in the theater or arts, having a particular social stand-
ing, or being recognized for achievement in the world of athletics.
Examples of persons who have been deemed to be in the public
eye or public figures are a prizefighter, a sheriff, an explorer, a
shopping center developer, a child prodigy, a dentist, and a
wealthy socialite.113
However, with the advances of technology and rise of social media,
the number of individuals who qualify as “public figures” has grown
exponentially.114 The Internet allows any person to achieve fame or
notoriety, usually from the comforts of his or her own home.115 This
new class of public figures will need to be addressed by the courts
in order to cement its status in privacy doctrine.
110. Public Figure Doctrine Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL (2016), https://defini
tions.uslegal.com/p/public-f igure-doctrine [https://perma.cc/J2R9-8GPA].
111. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
112. Richard E. Kaye, INVASION OF PRIVACY BY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS,
103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 159, at § 6 (Dec. 2016).
113. Id. (internal citations omitted).
114. Id.
115. Kate Knibbs, How Social Media Has Changed What It Means to be a Celebrity,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/celebrity-so
cial-media-anger [https://perma.cc/BKG2-ZRCD].
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B. Distinction Between Public and Private Figures in Privacy-
Related Causes of Actions
United States common law began to distinguish public figures
from non-public figures in terms of privacy rights in the area of
defamation.116 The first case in which the Supreme Court discussed
this issue was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in 1964. New York
Times Co. established for the first time that “public official[s]” face
a higher standard when proving defamation; they must prove “ac-
tual malice” on the part of the defamer.117 The Court went on to
define actual malice as:
1) Knowledge that the information being distributed is
false;118 or
2) The information is distributed with reckless disregard
of the truthfulness of the information.119
This “actual malice” standard defined in New York Times Co.
was expanded to include “public figures,” not just public officials
(individuals holding governmental positions), by the Supreme Court
in Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.120 Chief
Justice Warren’s opinion in Associated Press has been held by the
lower courts as the prevailing law.121 Chief Justice Warren reasoned
that “[m]any individuals who do not hold governmental office are
nonetheless intimately involved in the resolution of public issues,
using their fame and power to shape events in areas of concern to
society at large.”122 This stressed the importance of the work that pub-
lic figures do that shapes the “resolution of public issues” or directly
or indirectly affects public life or the lives of private citizens.123
The Supreme Court next addressed the public figure doctrine
in 1974 in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.124 Smolla and Nimmer, au-
thors of a 1996 treatise on the First Amendment and the Freedom
of Speech, explain Gertz’s impact: “Gertz attempted to resolve the
inherent friction between freedom of speech and protection of repu-
tation by announcing a grouping of rules setting forth the minimum
116. See generally N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 268 (1964).
117. Id. at 279–80.
118. Id. at 280.
119. Id.
120. 3 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:4, at 23-56.3–23-56.4 (2017).
121. Id. at 23-56.4.1–23-56.4.3.
122. Id. at 23-56.4.2.
123. Id. at 23-56.4.2–23-56.4.3.
124. Id. at 23-56.4.4.
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constitutional requirements for compensating injury to reputation.”125
These requirements included the definite rule that any claims brought
by a public official or figure must always meet the New York Times
Co. “actual malice” test.126 Additionally, the Court required that
“[d]efamation suits brought by private individuals (at least those
concerning public issues) must at [a] minimum be based upon proof
of ‘fault,’ which has come to be understood as requiring a minimum
of ‘negligence’ in all cases.”127 This highlights the differences be-
tween the standards for public figures and private individuals.
The Court held two rationales for this distinction between pub-
lic and private individuals—the first was access to media.128 Smolla
and Nimmer again explain: “Given the fact that, generally, public
officials and public figures enjoy significantly greater access to chan-
nels of effective communication, the Court assumed that they have,
as a class, a more realistic opportunity to contradict the lie or correct
the error than do private individuals.”129 In terms of revenge porn in-
vasion of privacy issues, there is no lie or error to be corrected, which
is why the court’s emphasis on defamation in this area is misplaced.
The second rationale was the more traditional voluntariness ap-
proach.130 “People who voluntarily attain public figure status often
have assumed roles of special prominence in social affairs, and in all
fairness they can be required to accept greater public scrutiny and
greater exposure to defamation as part of the cost of such fame.”131
Again, this rationale does not extend to instances of revenge porn,
as an individual’s voluntary acceptance of “greater public scrutiny”
does not include an acceptance of the public viewing their naked
image or video.132 Scrutiny of one’s actions, words, or work is under-
standable for public figures, but asking them to give up any right to
privacy for their bodies or private image is too much.
C. Public Figure Doctrine in Terms of IIED
The leading case concerning the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and public figures is Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.133
125. Id. at 23-56.4.6.
126. 3 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:4, 23-56.4.6 (2017).
127. Id. at 23-56.4.7.
128. Id. at 23-56.4.8.
129. Id. (internal citations omitted).
130. Id. at 23-56.4.8–23-56.4.9.
131. Id. at 23-56.4.9.
132. 3 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:4, 23-56.4.9 (2017).
133. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opin-
ion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601,
603–05 (1990).
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In that case, plaintiff Jerry Falwell, a well-known religious and po-
litical leader, sued Hustler Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flint,
for intentional infliction of emotional distress after Hustler pub-
lished a satirical account of Falwell committing incestuous acts with
his mother.134 The Court ultimately held that “the First and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit public figures” from recovering under
an IIED claim without evidence of actual malice on behalf of the
inflicter.135 Paul A. LeBel, writing for the University of Colorado
Law Review, describes the Court’s holding very well:
The Court instead appeared to be distracted by a hypothetical
question along the lines of whether a publisher such as The
Washington Post should be liable for the emotional discomfort of
a public figure intentionally caused by a publication such as a
Herblock editorial cartoon. Stating that he could find no princi-
pled basis on which to distinguish a case of that sort from the
case that was actually before the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for seven of the Justices, concluded that Falwell could
not maintain an action for damages for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress without proof that a false statement of fact
had been made with “actual malice,” and accordingly set aside
the lower court judgment in Falwell’s favor.136
This “actual malice” standard is carried over from the New York
Times Co. precedent surrounding libel and defamation suits.137 In
that case, the court defined “actual malice” as acting “with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.”138
The actual malice standard will be impossible to prove in cases
of nonconsensual pornography, as there is no truth or falsity to one’s
naked image or video. However, that does not mean that a public
figure cannot feel the effects of the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress through the sharing of this material, as the material
itself is arguably as harmful as false information shared in the
traditional IIED claim.
134. Id. at 605.
135. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
136. Paul A. LeBel, Emotional Distress, the First Amendment, and “This Kind of
Speech”: A Heretical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. COLO. L. REV.
315, 316–17 (1989). LeBel was critical of the Falwell decision, arguing that it did not leave
enough room for victims to recover under a traditional intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.
137. Id. at 317. See Section III.B of this Note.
138. E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Libel and Slander: What Constitutes Actual Malice,
Within Federal Constitutional Rule Requiring Public Officials and Public Figures to
Show Actual Malice, 20 A.L.R. 3d 988 (1968).
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This Note suggests creating a standard of presumptive actual
malice in cases where an individual’s private, potentially embar-
rassing or harmful, information is shared when there is no truth
component to the information. A presumption of actual malice would
allow these victims to pursue a civil remedy under an IIED claim.
Additionally, the sharing of another’s sexually explicit material
without her consent or knowledge should be presumed malicious
because of the inherently negative consequences to the victims of
these attacks. Spreading these materials is a hateful act that gives
the perpetrator very little, if any, arguable benefit.
The concept of a presumptive actual malice standard already
exists in the legal world.139 Also known as implied malice, it is “a
legal presumption that dispenses with the proof of common-law
actual malice when the publication [of information or material] is
actionable per se.”140 While not exhaustive, the implied malice stan-
dard has been an element in cases of “malicious prosecution, wilful
misconduct (according to terminology employed by at least some of
the courts), injurious falsehood (false words), disparagement of
goods . . ., various forms of unfair business competition, interference
with either contract or prospective advantageous business relations,
and prima facie tort.”141
D. Public Figure Doctrine in Terms of Invasion of Privacy
In general, the common law has held that the public has a
legitimate interest in a public figure’s activities or character.142
However, “[m]ore recent cases suggest that even in the case of a
public figure, the facts published have to meet a ‘newsworthiness’
test to defeat the plaintiff’s cause of action for public disclosure of
those facts.”143 Thus “one’s entire private life and past history [do
not necessarily] become fair game for news media exploitation.”144
139. Wallace K. Lightsey, John C. Few, Steven P. Groves, & Linda W. Rogers, Malice:
Actual and Implied, 20 S.C. JUR. LIBEL & SLANDER § 5, Westlaw (database updated June
2017) (Dec. 2016).
140. Id.
141. Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Kraus, & Alfred W. Gans, Motive, Purpose and
Intent as Elements; “Malicious Acts,” 1 AM. LAW OF TORTS § 1:12, at 57 (2013).
142. Id. See 103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 159 § 2, supra note 25.
143. Kaye, supra note 112 (citing Lowe v. Hearst Communications, Inc., 487 F.3d 246,
29 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2081 (5th Cir. 2007); Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528
F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1098 (D. Haw. 2007); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762,
768 (BNA) 1121 (1st Dist. 1983)).
144. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 n.2 (1976). This is especially
relevant for nonconsensual pornography cases, which is the epitome of ‘one’s entire
private life.’ While the public has a right to information about a public f igure’s character
or activities, I cannot see how nude or intimate images can qualify in this category.
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Based on lower court decisions that have interpreted the legitimate
public interest standard,
[T]here [must be at least] a rational and . . . arguably [a] close
relationship[,] between the facts revealed and the activity to be
explained[, and the media] should not be [entitled to a] no-holds-
barred rummaging . . . through the private lif[e] of [an individ-
ual] engaged in [an] activit[y] of public interest under the pretense
of elucidating that activity or the person’s participation in it.145
The key in these cases is how the court will define “newsworthi-
ness.”146 While there is no universal test, many courts use a three-part
test that focuses on: “[(1)] the social value of the facts published,
[(2)] the depth of the . . . intrusion into ostensibly private affairs,
and [(3)] the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a
position of public notoriety.”147
Under both the legitimate public concern and the newsworthi-
ness analyses, nonconsensual pornography fails the standards. In
reference to a “legitimate public concern,” there is no rational rela-
tionship between a public figure’s work, whether it be in government,
film, television, music, or otherwise, and their private images, un-
less the public figure had the intention of distributing the private
images themselves. Additionally, in terms of newsworthiness, there
is little, if any, social value to nude or private images; the depth of
the intrusion upon the public figure’s privacy is immense, and the
majority of private figures have not acceded to a position of public
notoriety that includes their naked or intimate image.
IV. ARGUMENT FOR CIVIL REMEDIES FOR PUBLIC FIGURE VICTIMS
OF NONCONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY
The denial of privacy rights to public figures stemmed from an
age of localized, slow news cycles, where information was more
easily verified and the lives of public figures were not so intensely
invaded by the outside world.148 Today’s media allows individuals to
invade the bodily privacy of public figures and disseminate that
private, sensitive information. Because of these changes in technol-
ogy and media in today’s world, and the particular harms felt by
victims of nonconsensual pornography, the public figure privacy
145. Id. at 1289. Cf. Lowe v. Hearst Communications, Inc., 487 F.3d 246, 29 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 2081 (5th Cir. 2007).
146. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969).
147. Id.
148. See Part III of this Note.
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doctrine should be amended to allow public figure victims of non-
consensual pornography to recover a civil remedy under either an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim or an invasion of
privacy through public disclosure of private facts claim.
The act of disseminating nonconsensual pornography does not
align with the original rationale of the public figure doctrine. As
related above, “[t]he public figure doctrine [was established as] an
attempt to strike a balance between the First Amendment interest
in a free press from the self-censorship considerations arising from
the existence of libel laws and the state interest in providing civil
remedies for defamatory falsehood.”149 This First Amendment
interest in a free press does not include the interest of sexually
explicit, private photos or videos.150 The public has no legitimate
interest in these materials.151 The state’s interest in protecting the
privacy of nonconsensual pornographic materials is inherently
higher than its interest in protecting the privacy of legitimate
newsworthy material.152 Additionally, while public figures do volun-
tarily enter the public realm, and thus voluntarily give up a certain
amount of expectation of privacy into their lives, this voluntariness
cannot include the giving up of the image of one’s naked body or
other sexually explicit, sensitive material. Asking this of public
figures is too much and goes beyond the scope of what the free press
should include.153
Allowing public figures to recover from revenge porn attacks
under two different legal tort remedies will help victims recover
from their trauma and will potentially deter the spread of non-
consensual pornography of public figures in the future. By allowing
public figures to recover under an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, with the inclusion of an implied or presumed actual
malice standard, the court will give redress to public figures who
have suffered great emotional, social, financial, or psychological
harm from a revenge porn attack. And by allowing public figures to
recover under an invasion of privacy through public disclosure of
149. Public Figure Doctrine Law and Legal Definition, supra note 110.
150. Id.
151. The legitimate interest referred to here is the one that the public has in infor-
mation about public f igures. This Note does not argue that the public does not have any
legitimate interest in the lives of public figures, only that the legitimate interest does
not extend to public f igures’ private, nude images or videos.
152. This is because the nonconsensual pornography gives little-to-no benefit to so-
ciety and its interest in public f igures, unlike actual newsworthy material; protection of
a state’s citizens’ privacy interests in their body, on the other hand, holds great weight.
153. This Note does not attempt to go into the complexities of the First Amendment’s
right to freedom of the press. It only mentions in passing that nonconsensual porno-
graphic images should not fall into the covered entities of the right to freedom of the press.
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private facts claim, courts will be giving a voice to the inherent
privacy interest all humans, public and non-public alike, have in
their body and naked image.
A. Criminal Sanctions and Restitution as an Alternative Remedy
The criminal law that surrounds nonconsensual pornography
is quite extensive; it differs from state to state (including many states
that have no criminalization of the dissemination of nonconsensual
pornography), and varies in how successful it is in prosecuting and
punishing the perpetrators.154 The amount of information on crimi-
nal sanctions of revenge porn goes well beyond the scope of this
Note, but this Note will briefly address some of the different crimi-
nal routes available for prosecuting revenge porn perpetrators.
When criminal charges are pursued, they give victims of re-
venge porn a chance to receive restitution, as in the criminal case of
the Celebgate hacker.155 Restitution can be ordered by the court to
repay victims for any financial losses suffered as a result of the
crime being prosecuted.156 However, restitution is contingent on
both the defendant being found guilty of the accused revenge porn
crime and the defendant having the financial means to pay the
court-ordered restitution.157
While this is a potential option for public figure victims of
revenge porn, there are some limitations that make it not as good
of an option as recovering under an IIED or public disclosure of
private facts claim. Criminal law sanctions, tough enough to get
because of the general lack of criminal law surrounding noncon-
sensual pornography, are even tougher to successfully get in a case
involving a public figure victim of revenge porn, as the perpetrator
is usually an anonymous online presence.158 This is different from
non–public figure cases involving revenge porn, where the perpetra-
tor is generally known by and/or close to the victim and is more
easily identified.159 The varying laws, different standards, and elu-
sivity of the defendants make criminal restitution a poor remedy for
most public figure victims of revenge porn.
154. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 373–74 (2014).
155. See Section I.B of this Note.
156. Understanding Restitution, USAO N. DIST. GA. (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www
.justice.gov/usao-ndga/victim-witness-assistance/understanding-restitution [https://perma
.cc/BK3K-WUEX].
157. Id.
158. Citron & Franks, supra note 154, at 371.
159. Id. at 351.
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B. Civil Action Against the Online Website Operators of the Sites
Containing Nonconsensual Pornographic Materials as an
Alternative Remedy
Victims of revenge porn will often look to the websites them-
selves to take down any nonconsensual pornography posted by a
third-party user.160 Victims also often try to sue for a legal remedy
to enforce this deletion of material if the website’s operators refuse
to do it on their own.161 These remedies allow victims to get immedi-
ate relief from the harmful action—the posting of the revenge porn
images.162 Additionally, the offending party, the website operator, is
easily identifiable and reachable through the court system.163
However, this remedy is not easily achieved by most victims of
revenge porn.164 “[W]ebsite operators and their Internet Service
Providers . . . generally hold far-reaching immunity from the actions
of third-party posters.”165 A provision of the Communications De-
cency Act (§ 230) “allows revenge porn websites and their hosts to
retain immunity from the actions of the individuals who post the
images so long as the website did not create or develop the mate-
rial.”166 This makes it extremely difficult for hosting websites to be
held accountable for the posted nonconsensual pornography.167 In
one of the most relevant examples of case law, a Texas trial court
allowed a class action suit to be brought against a hosting website
for invasion of privacy by a class of victims of revenge porn.168 How-
ever, the Court of Appeals of Texas overturned the trial court’s
ruling, citing § 230 immunity as the inability to bring a claim
against the hosting website.169 Seeking to recover from the hosting
website is a poor alternative for public figure victims of revenge
porn because of the far-reaching immunity of website providers.
CONCLUSION
Public figures who have had private, pornographic material dis-
tributed to the public without their consent should be able to recover
160. Cecil, supra note 1, at 2522.
161. Id. at 2526.
162. Id. at 2525.
163. Id. at 2520–22.
164. Id. at 2525.
165. Id. at 2517.
166. Cecil, supra note 1, at 2517.
167. Id. at 2539.
168. See GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 753–55 (Tex. App. 2014).
169. Id. at 755.
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damages from the original distributors or thieves of the material
through an IIED or invasion of privacy claim. The original rationale
for excluding public figures for recovering damages in privacy dis-
putes, that public figures voluntarily inject themselves into the
public sector and assume the public scrutiny that comes with the
territory, does not apply in the new digital, internet and social
media–based era we live in today. An injection into today’s social
media–driven public sector should not give an automatic license to
the invasion of one’s bodily privacy. Additionally, there should be an
implied or presumptive standard of actual malice for public figure
victims of revenge porn in IIED or invasion of privacy by disclosure
of public facts cases because there is no truth element to noncon-
sensual pornography from which actual malice can be inferred.
The emotional, psychological, and tangible harms of revenge
porn affect public figures and private individuals in almost exactly
the same manner. While public figures do insert themselves into the
public eye and narrative, and inevitably opt in for public scrutiny
and comment, this insertion does not, or should not, include the
giving up of private, intimate, or nude images against their will.
There is no legitimate public interest in these images or videos to
justify the public’s need for these materials.
The Supreme Court should redefine the requirements for public
figures recovering under IIED or invasion of privacy by public
disclosure of private facts when the information that was distrib-
uted is nonconsensual pornography. Specifically, the Supreme Court
should take away the strict “actual malice” standard for IIED and
invasion of privacy claims for public figures who are victims of non-
consensual pornography attacks and replace it with a presumptive
standard of malice.
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